


Standardisation of GNSS Threat reporting and Receiver testing through International Knowledge Exchange, Experimentation and Exploitation [STRIKE3]



Mark Dumville
General Manager, NSL

National Space-Based PNT Advisory Board
7-8 December 2016
Crowne Plaza Redondo Beach and Marina
Redondo Beach, California



An initiative to protect our GNSS...

- Project funded by European GNSS Agency (GSA) under the H2020 Framework Programme for R&D




- Start date = 1 February 2016
- Duration = 3 years




STRIKE3 Project Rationale

- 6% of European GDP depends on GNSS (800BEuro)
- At the same time, GNSS vulnerabilities are being exposed and threats to degradation and denial of GNSS services are increasing.



- STRIKE3 provides a response at an international level to ensure that there is:
 - a standard for GNSS threat reporting and analysis
 - a standard for assessing the performance of GNSS receivers and applications under threat.

Monitor, Detect, Characterise, Mitigate, Protect **STRIKE3**



STRIKE3 International Network



At a range of infrastructures

- Major City Centres
- City-ring roads
- National timing labs
- Motorways/Road network
- Airports
- GNSS infrastructures
- Power stations
- Railway
- National Border (*)
- Port (*)

At a range of locations

- United Kingdom
- Sweden
- Finland
- Germany
- India
- France
- Poland
- Czech Republic
- Spain
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Netherlands
- Belgium (*)
- Croatia (*)
- Latvia (*)
- + 3 countries inside EU
- + 4 countries outside EU


25 monitoring sites



STRIKE3 “DETECTOR” equipment



- **GSS100D** - Interference detector
 - GPS/EGNOS/Galileo L1/E1
- **GSS200D** - Interference detector
 - multi-GNSS, multi-frequency



- Dedicated STRIKE3 project server
- Autonomous and persistent monitoring
- Records events in secure database

* Other equipment is provided by other STRIKE3 partners

STRIKE3 “Stakeholders”



A range of entities/functions:


- Government agencies
- Frequency regulators
- Road operators
- Tolling operators
- Airport operators
- Air Navigation Service Providers
- Power grids

A range of concerns:

- What is the scale of the problem?
- How do the results compare at different locations?
- Are there any patterns at my site? At other sites?
- What is the impact on GNSS receivers in the vicinity?
- What is the risk and what options exist to reduce the risk?



Number of events per location per time





Impact of an event on “Satellites in view”




STRIKE3 “Fingerprint”



1. Size, pressure, patterns
2. Identify distinguishing features
3. Classify the signature
4. Identify different “families”
5. Identify new “families”
6. Preserve the evidence
 - Create a catalogue
 - Reference for future events
 - Automatic pattern recognition



STRIKE3 “Database” [58,000 events]



STRIKE3 Results [4 sites, 7 days]




- Site1: Critical National Infrastructure (Power substation)
- Site2: Major Airport
- Site3: GNSS tolled motorway
- Site4: Capital City centre

Start time: 00:00:00 Saturday 26/11/2016

Stop time: 23:59:59 Friday 2/12/2016




Site 1: Power substation




Antenna splitter feeding GPS clock and DETECTOR



Site 1: Power substation




205 interferences



39 Chirp Jammers


Site1: Example waveforms




Site 2: GNSS tolled motorway



Site 2: GNSS tolled motorway




138 interferences




41 Chirp Jammers

Site2: Example waveforms





Site 3: Major Airport



DETECTOR located outside airport grounds


Site 3: Major Airport




400 interferences

13 Chirp Jammers

Site3: Example waveforms




Site 4: Capital City




Lots of RFI (incl jammers). Few high power events.



Site 4: Capital City




839 interferences




346 Chirp Jammers

Site4: 346 jamming events generated from 6 jammers



Event of the week...



- Start Time (UTC): 28/11/2016 10:23:48
- Duration (sec): 3167
- Max Power: 8.813935
- Loss of GNSS and positioning errors (70m max)



STRIKE3 Risk Assessments

- Analyse STRIKE3 data to compute **PROBABILITY** and **IMPACT**
- Use STRIKE3 database over time to (re)assess **RISK** at the site(s)

Site	Type	Probability	Duration	Power	Complexity	Impact	Risk
1	CNI	?				?	?
2	Motorway	?				?	?
3	Airport	?				?	?
...

- Use **RISK** based approach to develop business/investment cases

(1) Protect?

(2) Toughen?

(3) Augment?



thank you

If there is an interest in hosting a STRIKE3 sensor (for 6 months)
then please get in touch.

mark.dumville@nsl.eu.com

