

#### STRIKE3 Project


Standardisation of GNSS Threat reporting and Receiver testing through International Knowledge Exchange, Experimentation

and Exploitation [STRIKE3]

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**CGSIC** 

25-26 September 2017 Portland, OR, US



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#### STRIKE3 is an project to protect GNSS...

- Standardisation of GNSS Threat reporting and Receiver testing through International Knowledge Exchange, Experimentation and Exploitation [STRIKE3]
- Project funded by European GNSS Agency (GSA)
   under the European Commission's H2020 Framework Programme







- Start date = 1 February 2016
- Duration = 3 years









**Successfully completed Mid-term Review** 











### Some notable developments...

#### 1. GNSS air navigation



Airport operations suspended for 75minutes

2. GNSS road pricing

3. GNSS maritime/CNI




Exposed value at risk of £5B over 5 days due to loss of GNSS
See Andy Proctor's CGSIC'17 presentation





#### **STRIKE3** Project Rationale

- 6% of European GDP depends on GNSS (800BEuro)
- At the same time, GNSS vulnerabilities are being exposed and threats to degradation and denial of GNSS services are increasing.



- STRIKE3 provides a response at an international level to ensure that there is:
  - i. <u>a standard for GNSS threat reporting and analysis</u>
  - ii. a standard for assessing the performance of GNSS receivers and applications under threat.



#### **STRIKE3 Global Monitoring Network**

#### At a range of infrastructures

- Major City Centres
- City-ring roads
- National timing labs
- Motorways/Road network
- Airports
- GNSS infrastructures
- Power stations
- Railway
- EU Borders
- Ports







#### At a range of locations

- United Kingdom
- Sweden
- Finland
- Germany
- France
- Poland
- Czech Republic
- Spain
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Netherlands

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   Belgium
- Croatia
- Latvia
- India
- Vietnam
- Thailand
- Malaysia
- New Zealand
- Canada
- Singapore (pending)

#### STRIKE3 "DETECTOR" equipment






- GSS100D Interference detector
  - GPS/EGNOS/Galileo L1/E1



- GSS200D Interference detector
  - GPS/Galileo/EGNOS/GLONASS L1/E1/G1



- GSS200D' Interference detector
  - L1/L5 + ICAO/Eurocae interference masks
  - Spoofing detection



- Dedicated STRIKE3 project server
- Autonomous and persistent monitoring
- Records events in secure database

\* Other equipment is provided by other STRIKE3 partners








#### STRIKE3 "Stakeholders"

#### Involving a range of entities:


- Government agencies
- Frequency regulators
- Road operators
- Tolling operators
- Airport operators
- Air Navigation Service Providers
- Power grids



Number of events per location per time

#### Addressing a range of concerns:

- What is the scale of the problem?
- How do the results compare at different locations?
- Are there any patterns at my site? At other sites?
- What is the impact on GNSS receivers in the vicinity?
- What is the risk and what options exist to reduce the risk?



Impact of an event on "Satellites in view"









### STRIKE3 "Fingerprint"

- 1. Size, pressure, patterns
- 2. Identify distinguishing features
- 3. Classify the signature
- 4. Identify different "families"
- 5. Identify new "families"
- 6. Preserve the evidence
  - Create a catalogue
  - Reference for future events
  - Automatic pattern recognition













#### STRIKE3 "Database" [215,000 events]



Start of project until 31/03/2017



### STRIKE3 "Database" [1/2/2016 - 1/9/2017]







#### STRIKE3 Jammer events (day-of-week, time-of-day)













#### STRIKE3 RFI event durations & impacts


































#### Typical "Chirp" Jammer Waveforms





- Bandwidths, power, centre frequency, signal(s)
- Additional parameters: sweep rate, direction, return










#### "Exotic" Jammer waveforms are emerging...




#### Simple Rules to support validation

- It has a structure (it is deliberate, purposeful)
- It is mobile (exhibits same power profile as a jammer)
- It is seen multiple times (avoids being a one-off rogue "signal")
- It is seen multiple sites (demonstrates a distributed product)







### Matching "waveforms" to jammer "type/models"




5Mhz bandwidth, 1575Mhz centred



8Mhz bandwidth, drifting centre





Waveform detected at 4 STRiKE3 sites Europe and outside EU




2017





#### \*STRIKE3 Threat Reporting Standards

- Many more "RF threat waveforms" than reported in literature
- Large number of jammer "families" (varying complexity & impact)
- There is a need to share knowledge with international communities



- Multiple RFI monitoring systems exist, with difference features
- Any standard should reflect a minimum level of data
  - 1. Suppliers and vendors can offer advanced features
  - 2. Minimum requirement for monitoring and exchange










#### STRIKE3 Threat Monitoring and Reporting Standard










- Ensure event reports from different monitoring systems are compatible
- Minimise changes to existing monitoring system equipment
- Limit "sensitive" information that needs to be sent (and stored)
- Protect against data "Integrity" issues (copies/changes)
- Flexibility in data provision and analysis











### **STRIKE3 Quarterly Scorecards**

- STRIKE3 produces summary sheets every 3 months
- Includes update on STRIKE3 network and database









Available from: www.gnss-strike3.eu








# We would welcome discussions with entities interested in hosting a STRIKE3 monitoring unit

### Thank you



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